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Abstract: Price-concentration studies in banking typically find a significant and negative relationship 
between consumer deposit rates (i.e., prices) and market concentration. This relationship implies that 
highly concentrated banking markets are “bad” for depositors. It also provides support for the Structure-
Conduct-Performance hypothesis and rejects the Efficient-Structure hypothesis. However, these studies 
have focused almost exclusively on supply-side control variables and have neglected demand-side variables 
when estimating the reduced form price-concentration relationship. For example, previous studies have 
not included in their analysis bank-specific risk variables as measures of cross-sectional derived deposit 
demand. The authors find that when bank-specific risk variables are included in the analysis the 
magnitude of the relationship between deposit rates and market concentration decreases by over 50 
percent. They offer an explanation for these results based on the correlation between a bank’s risk profile 
and the structure of the market in which it operates. These results suggest that it may be necessary to 
reconsider the well-established assumption that higher market concentration necessarily leads to 
anticompetitive deposit pricing behavior by commercial banks. This finding has direct implications for the 
antitrust evaluations of bank merger and acquisition proposals by regulatory agencies. And, in a more 
general sense, these results suggest that any Structure-Conduct-Performance-based study that does not 
explicitly consider the possibility of very different risk profiles of the firms analyzed may indeed miss a 
very important set of explanatory variables. And, thus, the results from those studies may be spurious.  
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1.  Introduction 
Several articles that test the competing Structure-Performance hypotheses using price data have 
appeared in the literature.  For example, Berger and Hannan (1989, 1992), Calem and Carlino (1991), 
Hannan and Berger (1991), and Jackson (1992a), each test (among other things) the Structure-Conduct-
Performance (S-C-P) hypothesis versus the Efficient-Structure (E-S) hypothesis using price data.  In each 
of these articles the pricing data represent consumer deposit rates set by commercial banks.  In general, the 
results reported in these studies supported a negative and significant relationship between market 
concentration and deposit rates, providing support for the S-C-P and against the E-S hypothesis.  The S-
C-P, originated by Mason (1939) and Bain (1951), suggests that more concentrated markets may lead to 
collusive behavior and monopolistic pricing by firms. The E-S hypothesis, developed by Demsetz (1973) 
and Peltzman (1977), suggests that profits in concentrated markets may be systematically higher because of 
market competition over time which dictates that more efficient firms gain larger market share. 
There are several  documented reasons for using price data in general (Weiss 1986) and banking 
price data in particular (Hannan and Berger 1991) rather than profit data to test the validity of the S-C-P 
and E-S hypotheses.  The main reason usually offered is that price data provides a less noisy signal, relative 
to profit data, of cross-sectional differences in the degree of market competition.  However, the use of price 
data from consumer deposits may also have some inherent drawbacks.  One possible drawback, discussed 
by Dick (2005), Berger (1995), and Rhoades and Burke (1990), is the omission of firm-specific variables 
which may systematically affect the "cost" or the demand for deposits.  Several variables may affect a bank's 
demand for deposits and thus its reservation deposit rate. 
For example, one important variable is the cross-sectional riskiness of the individual banks being  
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analyzed.  That is, a bank that is more risky is likely to offer higher deposit rates (Brewer and Mondschean, 
1994). Therefore, the omission of risk measures may cause a spurious relationship to be estimated between 
relatively low deposit rates and high market concentration.  This is because market concentration may be 
negatively related to risk (Rhoades and Rutz 1982); and, risk (ceteris paribus) may be positively related to 
consumer deposit rates. Additionally, this risk-deposit rate relationship may have been accentuated by the 
moral hazard problems of flat-rate deposit insurance as discussed in Barth and Bradley (1989), Buser, 
Chen, and Kane (1981), and McKenzie, Cole, and Brown (1992).  The critical linkages, however, are 
between risk and market structure.  Are banks in relatively more concentrated markets less risky?  If the 
answer to this question is yes, then the empirical finding of a negative relationship between deposit rates and 
market concentration no longer provides support for the S-C-P  hypothesis, nor does it suggest rejection of 
the E-S hypothesis. This is because banks in more concentrated markets, if they are indeed less risky, 
would tend to pay on average lower consumer deposit rates (even in competitive markets) as the marginal 
value product of consumer deposits is equated to their marginal cost, or wage (deposit) rate.  
Does lower risk account for the negative relationship between price and market concentration in the 
banking industry?  This paper uses generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation to empirically test 
this hypothesis.  This empirical test is motivated by: (1) the findings of a significant negative relationship 
between market concentration and measures of bank riskiness as reported in Rhoades and Rutz (1982), (2) 
the findings of a positive and significant relationship between uninsured bank deposits and bank riskiness as 
reported in Brewer and Mondschean (1994), and (3) the possibility of a spurious correlation between 
deposit rates and market concentration as discussed in Berger (1995). 
This study is the first to directly incorporate firm-specific measures of risk into empirical tests of the  
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price-concentration relationship.  This is important because, in a very general sense, any Structure-Conduct-
Performance based study that does not explicitly consider the possibility of very different risk profiles of the 
firms analyzed may indeed miss a very important set of explanatory variables.  And, thus, the results from 
those studies may be spurious.  
The remainder of this paper provides some background on the S-C-P and E-S hypotheses in 
section 2, a brief discussion of the model specifications and data in section 3, the empirical results in section 
4, some robustness checks in section 5, and a very brief conclusion in section 6. 
 
2.  Market Structure, Market Conduct, and Market Performance
1 
The traditional market structure, conduct, and performance (S-C-P) literature occupies center stage 
in this summary.  However, the resource-based view on sustainable competitive advantage, as exemplified 
by Peteraf (1993), is  also  discussed because it captures the essence of the debate concerning the validity 
of the S-C-P paradigm.  
The origins of the theoretical foundations of the S-C-P paradigm are often traced to the work of 
Mason (1939) and Bain (1951).  These early works asserted that fewer firms in a market, reflecting a more 
concentrated structure, generally lead to less competitive conduct and less competitive performance.  
Conduct was usually defined in terms of competitive intensity in relation to price and output levels; 
performance was generally related to profit or price relative to cost ratios.  Even in those early years, it was 
recognized that market structure was important only as a predictor of market conduct.  Conduct was the 
variable from which to draw inferences about market performance.  However, because conduct was 
unobservable, market structure was cast in the role of an instrumental (or proxy) variable.  
  (4)  
Many economists were uncomfortable with the informality of the S-C-P theory.   Beginning in the 
mid-1960s a more rigorous theoretical foundation for the S-C-P was pursued.  Research by Stigler (1964) 
and several others demonstrated that under certain specialized market conditions, the S-C-P would hold.  
However, other economic theory has challenged the realism of those specialized conditions.  Furthermore, 
this theory has shown that the linkages between market structure variables and market performance can 
disappear under alternative very specialized conditions as in Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982) or under 
less specialized (but also less rigorous) conditions, as in Bain (1956).
2  Because of this, researchers have 
turned to empirical studies to address the question of the effect of market structure on conduct and 
performance. 
 
2.1.  Market S-C-P Empirical Studies 
Empirical S-C-P studies tend to fall into one of two groups. The first group measures statistical 
correlations between market concentration and measures of performance (e.g., concentration and profits).  
The other uses newer methods that attempt to measure and estimate patterns of firm conduct directly, 
instead of using market structure variables as proxies.  This second group offers the more promising 
approach and in this paper we follow the direct estimation of market conduct approach.  While the first 
group of studies represent a large and increasing literature,  Gilbert (1984) concluded that they present a 
mixed set of results overall and tend to suffer from several major methodological flaws.  
One major shortcoming of these empirical S-C-P studies is that they cannot distinguish between 
efficiency and market power as a source of market concentration or profitability (Demsetz 1973 and 
Peltzman 1977, 2000).  Economic theory tells us that a firm that can operate at lower cost or deliver a  
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superior product will drive its rivals out of business unless the rivals can imitate the successful firm.  
However, such superiority (or competitive advantage) would be manifested in terms of high market share 
(concentration) and high relative profitability precisely in those markets that are competitive.  More recent 
studies by Smirlock (1985), Berger (1995), and others have attempted to correct this flaw.  Their results 
suggest that market structure plays an economically insignificant role in explaining market performance. [For 
an excellent update and review of this empirical S-C-P literature see Shaffer (2004).] 
Another major problem with most empirical studies of market structure is the difficulty in defining the 
true geographic and product market to be evaluated.  As discussed in Jackson (1992b) and Shaffer (1992), 
this problem is especially severe in a multi-product industry such as banking.    The problem is further 
confounded because banks operate in several geographic markets simultaneously, which casts another 
shadow on the relevance of market structure as a useful predictor of competitive intensity or market conduct 
The search for a better predictor has led some scholars to advocate the firm-specific, or the resource-
based, approach for developing measures of competitive intensity, or market conduct. 
 
2.2.  The Resource-Based View 
Recently, a model of how firms compete has emerged from the strategic management area.  The 
model starts with the familiar foundation (in strategic management) that firms are heterogeneous.  However, 
as Peteraf (1993, p. 179) states, "the model has deepened our understanding regarding such topics as 
how resources are applied and combined, what makes competitive advantage sustainable, the nature 
of rents, and the origins or heterogeneity."  Peteraf also mentions that the contributions of resource-
based work have not been limited to these topics.  For example, our understanding of how service firms  
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choose to compete and decide the level of the intensity of that competition is also enriched by the resource-
based view in general and Peteraf's model in particular.   
It should be noted that these models are related to (and informed by) the very large body of work in 
the economics literature commonly labeled, or categorized as, product differentiation.
2  The roots of this 
product differentiation literature can be traced to the seminal work of Chamberlin (1933).  A common 
theme running through the resource-based literature and Peteraf's model is the importance of preserving the 
conditions that allow the firm to maintain a competitive advantage.  Thus, resources that make a firm 
different (or heterogeneous) relative to its competitors preserve its superior position.  This focus on what is 
often called imperfect imitability and imperfect substitutability provides an impressive foundation for 
developing models (e.g., Roth and Jackson  1995) that continues to increase our understanding of how 
firms compete. 
The resource-based view contributes to the debate on market structure, conduct, and performance 
linkages by suggesting that any source of superior performance is less likely to be market-specific (i.e., 
market structure) and more likely to be firm-specific.  Thus, the strategic management as well as the 
economics literature provides support for the use of firm-specific  measures (of risk ) in addition to 
traditional market structure variables.  
 
2.3.  Price-Concentration Studies 
Berger and Hannan (1989) provide the first comprehensive empirical study of the relationship 
between consumer deposit rates and market concentration.  Using a reduced form price equation, they 
estimate the relationship between consumer deposit rates and market concentration while controlling for a  
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wide array of market-specific and bank-specific variables.  Six different consumer deposit rates at 470 
banks over a ten quarter period are used in the analysis.  Using a variety of modeling assumptions, Berger 
and Hannan (1989) conclude that in general (except for longer-term CDs) consumer deposit rates tend to 
be negatively (and significantly) related to market concentration. 
Following Berger and Hannan (1989), Calem and Carlino (1991) investigate the relationship 
between consumer deposit rates and market structure by explicitly incorporating conduct as the link 
between structure and performance.  They address the question of whether banks typically behave 
strategically or competitively in general, and whether these behavior patterns are influenced by market 
concentration in particular.  They find that market c oncentration has a statistically significant but 
economically small effect on short-term consumer deposits, and that banks tend, in general, to behave more 
strategically than competitively. 
The use of linear models to estimate the price-concentration relationship for consumer deposits is 
challenged by Jackson (1992a). Using the model from Berger and Hannan (1989),  Jackson (1992a) re-
estimates it separately for high-, medium-, and low-concentration subsamples.  This re-estimation 
demonstrates that the price-concentration relationship is only negative and significant for the low subsample 
category for most types of consumer deposits.  However, Jackson (1992a) uses a different sample than 
Berger and Hannan (1989).  Berger and Hannan (1992) re-estimated their analysis using the Jackson 
(1992a) methodology.  They concluded that, although their results are not as strong as previously, the 
relationship between bank deposit rates and market concentration is generally negative, significant, and 
linear. 
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2.4.  Risk-Price/Risk-Concentration Studies 
Risk may influence the estimation of the price-concentration relationship in banking if price is 
influenced by risk; and risk is influenced by market structure.  Previous studies by Rhoades and Rutz (1982) 
and Heggestad (1977) demonstrated that market structure (concentration) is significantly negatively 
correlated with measures of bank riskiness.  Brewer and Mondschean (1994), Ellis and Flannery (1992), 
and Hannan and Hanweck (1988) find evidence that the premiums paid on uninsured deposits are positive 
and significantly related to measures of riskiness.  Additionally, Hughes and Mester (1994) find evidence 
that bank managers exhibit behavior inconsistent with risk-neutrality. 
These studies suggest that banks in more concentrated markets prefer and exhibit less risk.  As a 
consequence, they also may pay a lower risk premium on both insured and uninsured deposits.  That is, a 
bank may be willing to pay a relatively higher rate on its insured deposits if it must pay a relatively higher rate 
on its uninsured deposits (Brewer and Mondschean 1994; and Hannan and Hanweck 1988).  This is 
because insured and uninsured deposits are fungible in terms of satisfying the bank’s funding requirements. 
Thus, uninsured as well as insured deposit rates may be positively related to the level of bank-specific risk.  
For example, Barth (1991) documents that risky financial institutions, especially those that face financial 
distress, tend to pay relatively more for insured as well as uninsured deposits.  Thus, this study directly 
incorporates bank-specific measures of risk when estimating the price-concentration relationship. 
 
3.  Model Specification and Data 
 The model developed here has a similar conceptual framework as that discussed in Neumark and 
Sharpe (1992).  It is based on models of the banking firm found in Diamond (1984), Flannery (1982), and  
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Hughes and Mester (1994), which focus on the bank's role as investment agent for households.  That is, 
banks take savings in the form of deposits from households and transform these funds into loans or 
securities by lending them out as investments.  Banks use the deposits (savings) as inputs to produce loans 
or securities (investments).  Thus, banks are assumed to be more efficient investors relative to depositors 
because of diversification benefits, a reduction in monitoring costs, or other economies of scale. 
The model assumes that the loan and security markets in which banks invest are competitive.  This 
seems reasonable given the large federal funds and Treasury security markets that allow banks to invest on a 
national scale.  However, because banks tend to draw their deposits from confined geographical areas, such 
as metropolitan statistical areas or counties, the deposit markets are assumed to exhibit departures from 
perfect competition. 
As in Neumark and Sharpe (1992), departures from the perfect competition framework provide 
part of the basis for the empirical model developed here.  For example, if banks in more concentrated 
deposit markets face a relatively less elastic deposit supply schedule they may extract more of the 
producers’ surplus from the business of investing by paying lower rates on their deposits.  Berger and 
Hannan (1989) provide some evidence of this negative cross-sectional relationship between market 
concentration and deposit interest rates.  However, Jackson (1992a) provides evidence that this cross-
sectional relationship between deposit rate levels and market concentration may be ambiguous.  
Additionally, our model recognizes that bank managers may not be risk neutral and may choose 
differing levels of risk in their investment portfolio depending on their risk objectives (Hughes and Mester 
1994).  Furthermore, risk levels may be negatively related to market concentration as demonstrated in 
Rhoades and Rutz (1982).  Risk levels may also be positively related to market-clearing deposit rates as  
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reported in Brewer and Monschean (1994). 
Following Berger and Hannan (1989,1992,and 1993), Calem and Carlino (1991), and Jackson 
(1989,1992a), our model of bank consumer deposit rate setting behavior is estimated as the following 
reduced-form price equation: 
 
rijt   =  a + ßCONCjt + ?
N Xijt + eijt ,          (1) 
 
where;  rijt  represents the interest rate paid by bank i in local market j at time t for a specific category of 
consumer deposits.  CONCjt represents a measure of market concentration in local banking market j at 
time t, and X ijt represents a vector of control variables.  The vector of control variables allow for firm-
specific and market-specific variations in deposit demand and supply schedules faced by individual banks. 
The parameters are denoted by a, ß, and the vector ?
N, and eijt represents an error term. 
As in most of the cited articles, the three-firm concentration ratio (CR3) is used to measure CONC. 
3  Following Jackson (1992a), the other non-risk related explanatory variables included are market growth 
(MG), market share (MS), the six-month Treasury bill rate (TB6), the natural log of total assets (LOGTA), 
and a time-period dummy variable (Qt ) for each quarter (t) except the first. We also include an indicator 
variable (BHC) that is equal to one, zero otherwise, if the bank is part of a bank holding company.  Being 
part of a larger organization (BHC) may influence the pricing behavior of the individual bank.  
 
3.1  Risk Variables 
We add to this standard set of control variables three other factors to capture information on the  
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major types of risks faced by financial institutions.  First, as in Rhoades and Rutz (1982), Brewer and 
Mondschean (1994), and Hughes and Mester (1994), we use total capital as a percentage of total assets 
(CRATIO) as a measure of capital adequacy.  Of course, the major component of the total capital measure 
is equity capital.  By increasing capital while holding total assets constant, a bank can lower its riskiness.  In 
contrast, insufficient capital relative to total assets makes a bank more risky.  During the thrift crisis of the 
1980s many poorly capitalized savings and loan associations paid higher rates on insured deposits to attract 
additional deposits quickly while investing the proceeds in risky projects.  Similarly, a low-capital bank may 
pay higher deposit rates on insured deposits relative to a high-capital bank.  The importance of bank capital 
and capital ratios is well established in the literature.  For example, Berger, Herring, and Szego (1995) 
report that the empirical evidence generally suggests that higher equity is associated with lower overall risk.  
And, that virtually every bank failure model finds that a higher equity-to-assets ratio is associated with a 
lower predicted probability of failure.  
 Second, we use the percentage of non-performing loans to total assets (NONPERF) as a measure 
of asset quality.  A lower NONPERF ratio may be indicative of a stronger economic environment and/or 
more efficient management of credit risk.  It is hypothesized that a lower NONPERF ratio will be 
associated with less risk, and as a result, a lower deposit rate. 
 Lastly, we use the quarterly change in the cumulative twelve-month gap between rate-sensitive 
assets and liabilities as a percentage of total assets (GAPCHG) as a measure of the likely interest rate risk 
adjustment strategy that the bank is pursuing.  This dollar maturity gap variable allows us to test whether 
banks strategically price consumer deposits as a function of their interest rate risk exposure goals.  We 
assume that banks establish long term interest rate risk exposure targets, and changes in the cumulative  
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twelve-month gap captures exogenous shocks or deviations from that long term target.  These deviations 
from target are assumed to influence the pricing of deposits as banks set deposit prices to correspond to 
their new demand for rate sensitive assets or liabilities given their long term interest rate risk exposure target. 
       
 
3.2  The Data 
The risk measures and LOGTA above are taken from  Reports of Condition on U.S. 
domestically-chartered commercial banks.  The other variables, except TB6, are from the Summary of 
deposits reports. The consumer deposit data are taken from the Federal Reserve's Monthly survey of 
selected deposits and other accounts.  
On average, our sample consists of about 257 banks observed quarterly over the March 1984 to 
December 1992 time period. The sample period ends in 1992 as that is the last year interest rate data was 
collected for the complete set of deposit types used in our study.  Our resulting data set is a pooled cross-
section time-series sample with 9240 observations for the equally weighted index of consumer deposit rates 
and the other firm-specific variables. 
The definitions of the variables used in this analysis are presented in Table 1.  As in the extant 
literature, the dependent variable is based on consumer (or retail) deposit interest rates paid by banks 
expressed in basis points.  However, we depart somewhat from previous price-concentration studies by 
using an equally weighted index of three deposit types.
4  These deposit types are money market deposit 
accounts, Super NOW accounts, and six-month certificates of deposit accounts.  These deposit categories 
have all been used elsewhere individually, as in Berger and Hannan (1989, 1992, 1993), Calem and Carlino  
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(1991), and Jackson (1989, 1992a, 1992b).  Using an index of consumer deposit rates acknowledges that 
banks may set deposit rates strategically, as discussed in Calem and Carlino 1991.  This recognizes that 
different types of deposits may compete with each other on an intrabank level.
5   Also, the analysis of 
indexed deposits is consistent with the legal definition of “bank product” which refers to a broad category of 
banking products and services (Rhoades and Burke 1990). 
 
4.  Empirical Model and Results 
Based upon the reduced-form price equation developed in Section 3, the following two equations 
are estimated: 
 
rijt = a + ß CR3j + ?1 MGj  + ?2 MSi  + ?3 TB6t + ?4 LOGTAit + ?5 BHCit + DUM + eijt           (2) 
and, 
rijt = a + ß CR3j + ?1 MGj  + ?2 MSi  + ?3 TB6t + ?4 LOGTAit + ?5 BHCit +  
?6 CRATIOit  + ?7 NONPERFit + ?8 GAPCHGit+ DUM + eijt ,  (3) 
 
where; rijt   is the equally weighted consumer deposit rate index, eijt  is an error term,  
DUM is equal to a vector of dummy variable and their associated coefficients.  The dummy variable (Qt) 
equals one when the quarter variable equals t.  The other variables are as discussed above and defined in 
Table 1.  Banks tend to adjust deposit rates differently (i.e., more rapidly) in a period of falling interest rates 
relative to a period of rising interest rates (Berger and Hannan 1991, Jackson 1989, and Neumark and 
Sharpe 1992).  That is why time dummy variables are included in the equation to distinguish rising rate from  
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the falling rate periods. 
Summary statistics for the variables used in this study are presented in Table 2, panel A.  Panel B of 
Table 2 presents a correlation matrix of selected variables.  There are at least four points worth mentioning 
about the correlation matrix of Table 2.  First, CR3 (the measure of market concentration) is significantly 
positively correlated with CRATIO and significantly negatively correlated with  NONPERF.  Both 
correlations suggest that banks in higher concentration market are less risky.  Second, notice that rIndex is 
significantly correlated with the risk variables in a fashion consistent with the hypothesis that lower bank risk 
is associated with lower deposit rates.  Third, the correlation coefficient for TB6 and rIndex is very large and 
significant (0.83).  And, fourth, the correlation between rIndex and CR3 is negative and significant, although 
small (-0.08). 
These findings from the simple correlation analysis provide motivation to investigate further the role 
that risk plays in the price-concentration relationship. 
 
4.1 Estimation Technique 
Estimation of equations (2) and (3) with pooled cross-sectional time series data and ordinary least 
squares (OLS) is potentially inefficient because of the likelihood of time-varying, and firm-specific 
differences in the error terms.  Because of these potential problems with serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity, the equations are estimated using the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) 
procedure.  Moment conditions of the following form are used in the estimation process: 
,   r     z    
T
1
  =   ) (    g ijt t
T
1    =    i
t ˜ ￿ q   
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where ? = (a, ß, ?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, ?31, ?32, ?33, ?34 )N for equation (2 ) and ? = (a, ß, ?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, ?5, ?6, ?7, ?31, 
?32, ?33, ?34)N for equation (3).  The z t  is the instrumental variables vector.  The instruments used in this 
analysis are the same as the explanatory variables in each equation.   Therefore, there is exactly the same 
number of moment conditions as the parameters to be estimated.  The system is fully identified. 
The GMM estimators are obtained by minimizing the following  quadratic form: 
with respect to the ? vector.   WT  is a symmetric, positive definite weighting matrix.  Hansen (1982) has 
shown that using the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the error terms as the weighting matrix 
gives efficient and consistent estimates of the parameters.  Since WT is not known in advance, the GMM 
estimators are obtained in a two-stage process. In the first stage, the identity matrix is used as the weighting 
matrix to obtain initial estimates of the coefficients.  Then using these coefficients, consistent estimates of the 
variance-covariance matrix are obtained.   Next, the inverse of this variance-covariance matrix is used as 
the weighting matrix in the second stage where the coefficients are re-estimated. Notice that in this context, 
GMM estimators of the coefficients in equations (2) and (3) will be identical to OLS point estimators.  
However, the standard errors of the estimates are corrected for an unknown form of serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West (1987) correction with one lag.  Therefore, the GMM estimators 
will be consistent and efficient among a large class of linear and nonlinear estimators.  
 
4.2 Model Estimation 
) (     g      W   ) (     g T T T q q ¢   
  (16)  
The GMM estimation results for equations (2) and (3) are presented in Table 3.  The second 
column of Table 3 shows the results of estimating equation (2).
6  The third column of Table 3 presents the 
results of estimating equation (3).   
Equation (3) is our expanded version of equation (2) that includes the major variable of interest, the 
risk variables.  The GMM estimation of these two equations presented in Table 3 reveals several interesting 
results.
7  First, notice that in column two the coefficient for concentration (CR3) is relatively large (-0.66), 
negative and significant at the one percent level. However, in column three when the risk measures are 
include, the coefficient for concentration (CR3) is reduced by more than fifty percent to -0.30.  Although the 
coefficient is still significant, the magnitude of its influence is reduced by over half.  This suggests that 
concentration is a less significant explanatory variable when risk measures are also included in estimating the 
price-concentration relationship in banking. Second, note that the coefficients of the risk variables in column 
three are all significant (at the 5 percent level or better) and have the expected signs.  For example, the 
negative and significant coefficient for CRATIO implies that, on average, banks with lower capital to assets 
percentages pay more for deposits.  Or, conversely, banks with higher capital ratios pay less for deposits. 
This result is consistent with Rhoades and Rutz (1982) and Brewer and Mondschean (1994).  It is also 
supported by the theoretical model of Hughes and Mester (1994). 
The CRATIO variable may however present an estimation problem because of collinearity with 
LOGTA.  That is, larger banks tend to have lower CRATIO, on average.  This problem could be 
eliminated by dropping LOGTA from equation (3).  However, LOGTA may be an important variable in 
explaining risk.  LOGTA may be a proxy for portfolio diversification, or too-big to fail, or a larger array of 
services and convenience.  Each of these factors may affect the riskiness of the bank and the equilibrium  
  (17)  
deposit rates it would pay.  Thus, we desire to maintain LOGTA in equation (3).  Tests of multicollinearity 
revealed that LOGTA did not present a problem.
8  It is interesting to note, however, that the results of 
equation (3) are not material affected by deleting LOGTA from the analysis. 
 The positive and significant coefficient for NONPERF suggests that banks with lower non-
performing loans, or less risky portfolios, pay lower deposit rates.  This is consistent with banks in high 
concentration markets paying lower deposits rates given that they also tend to exhibit lower levels of risk in 
their portfolios. 
The coefficient of GAPCHG is positive and significant.  This implies that a bank that experiences a 
larger increase in rate sensitive assets than liabilities last period tends to pay relatively more for short-term 
(rate sensitive) consumer deposits (liabilities) this period.  This may stem from an attempt by the bank to 
price its deposits in a manner that would maintain its gap at some preset target level.  That is, the relative 
value of short-term deposits is higher because they allow for the adjustment the gap, managing interest rate 
risk exposure (see Brewer 1985).  We find that our main results above are robust to many changes in 
model specifications.  Some of these modeling changes along with several diagnostic checks are discussed 
in the next section. 
5.  Robustness checks  
The results from estimating equation (3) suggest that our risk variables greatly reduce the importance 
of market concentration in explaining consumer deposit rates.  However, because our risk variables are 
correlated with market concentration, the issue of multicollinearity between CR3, NONPERF, CRATIO, 
and GAPCHG must be considered.  As with the case of LOGTA and CRATIO mentioned earlier, tests of 
multicollinearity revealed that no such problem exists for CR3, NONPERF, CRATIO, and GAPCHG.    
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Additionally, we orthogonalized CR3 with respect to NONPERF, CRATIO, and GAPCHG.  
Specifically, we regressed separately each of the three risk variables on CR3 and substituted the three sets 
of residuals from these regressions for the risk variables in equation (3).  The procedure provides an 
estimate of the explanatory power of the risk variables excluding correlations with CR3.  This analysis 
reveals that the residuals of the risk variables have similar coefficients with similar significance levels as the 
non-orthogonalized risk variables.  This is strong evidence that market concentration does not influence the 
consumer deposit rates through its correlation with the risk characteristics of banks. 
Our second modeling consideration for equation (3) acknowledges the possible endogeneity of the 
market share (MS), market growth (MG), and maturity gap (GAPCHG) variables.  We recognize that 
multiple endogenous variables, or simultaneous equations, could easily be handled within our GMM 
estimation framework.  However, because the notion that consumer deposit rates (the dependent variable in 
our model) may influence the banks MS (an independent variable in our model) is well known we go a step 
farther.
9 In particular, we address the endogeneity possibility by estimating equation (3) without the MS 
variable.  That analysis reveals that the omission of MS does not change our results. 
The next independent variable of concern is market growth (MG). Again, w e address the 
endogeneity possibility by estimating equation (3) without the MG variable.  That analysis reveals that the 
omission of MG does not change our results.  
To argue that GAPCHG is endogenous is to argue that deposit rates not only influence the structure 
of deposit demand but also the structure of loan demand.  That is, because the maturity gap is the 
difference between rate sensitive assets and liabilities, and because deposit rates are unlikely to affect asset 
(loan) quantities, it is unlikely that deposit rates influence the maturity gap as much as the maturity gap  
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influences deposit rates.  Stated differently, bank managers are more likely to have significantly more control 
over deposit rates than over their maturity gaps.  As such, deposit rates are more likely to be changed by 
bank managers as the maturity gap changes rather than vice versa. 
Thus, although it may appear at first glance that CR3, MS, MG, and GAPCHG suffer from 
endogeneity problems in equation (3), closer inspection reveals that for each of these variable that is not the 
case. 
Our final modeling consideration addresses the use of the deposit rate index.  If we use individual 
deposit rates to estimate equation (3), our results are qualitatively similar.  In general, the addition of risk 
variables to our consumer deposit rates estimation equation either eliminates or significantly reduces the 
explanatory power of market concentration for each of the four deposit rates when analyzed on an 
individual basis.  
  (20)  
6.  Conclusion 
The debate on whether market concentration implies collusive or competitive market behavior 
continues. The use of price instead of profitability as an indicator of performance may well serve as a 
superior form of analysis in this debate.  Such analysis, however, must incorporate an examination of the 
relevant firm-specific risk variables when estimating these relationships.  As with the results reported herein 
for our index of consumer deposit rates, it is demonstrated that the negative relationship between price and 
market concentration may say more about the riskiness of banks in concentrated markets rather than it does 
about collusive behavior.  And, although this study focuses on the banking industry, the results may well be 
indicative of many other industries.  More generally, in any industry where firm specific risks are highly 
correlated with market structures studies that do not explicitly model these firm specific risks will suffer 
serious specification errors.    
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Endnotes 
 
1.  For an excellent overview of this literature see Shaffer (1994). This section draws   heavily 
from his article. 
 
2.  We thank Stephen Rhoades for pointing this out to us. 
 
3.  We obtain similar results using the Herfindahl Index in equation (3). 
 
4.  We also estimated the equations using all possible combinations of the deposit rates   used in the 
study as alternative indexes.  The results were qualitatively similar for   equation (3). 
 
5.  We test this hypothesis by estimating time-series correlations of the three deposit rates for each 
bank in our sample that has a complete time-series of rates. We find that all three rates are 
significantly correlated (at the 5 percent level) over time for over 94 percent of banks tested. 
 
6.  We began the empirical analysis by comparing the estimated results from equation (2) to previous 
studies in the literature. Using MMDA (money market deposit account) rates as the test case we 
were able to exactly replicate the coefficient of the price-concentration relationship as reported by 
Berger and Hannan (1989) and Jackson (1992a). 
 
7.  We also estimate equations (2) and (3) using OLS for each quarter (i.e., time series).  The results 
are that for 25 of the 36 cross-sectional estimations of equation (2) CR3 has a negative and 
significant (at the 5 percent level) coefficient.  When the risk variables are added [i.e., equation (3)] 
the coefficient of CR3 becomes insignificant in 32 of the 36 cases above.  We thank Robert 
Connolly for recommending this analysis. 
 
8.  We orthogonalized CRATIO and LOGTA by: (1) regressing CRATIO on LOGTA, and   (2) 
substituting the residuals from this regression for CRATIO in equation (3).  This   provides an 
estimate of the explanatory power of CRATIO excluding correlations with   LOGTA.  When this is 
done LOGTA is insignificant, and residual (CRATIO) is very   significant and negative.   
 
9.  We thank Timothy Hannan for pointing this out to us. 
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Table 1.  VARIABLE DEFINITIONS   
 
Endogenous Variables (r) 
rmmda      -  Money market deposit account rate in basis points paid on the largest 
dollar volume of deposits issued during the 7-day period ending on the last 
Wednesday of the month of the respective quarter, 3/84-12/92. 
 
rsnow      -  Super-NOW rate for the same period. 
 
rcd6      -  6-month certificates of deposit rate for the same period. 
 
rIndex       -  Equally weighted index (average) of the three        
      deposit rate variables above. 
 
Risk Variables 
CRATIO    -  Total capital as a percentage of total assets each quarter.  
 
NONPERF    -  Non-performing loans as a percentage of total assets each quarter. 
 
GAPCHG    -  Change in cumulative 12-month gap as a percentage of total assets  
        each quarter. 
 
Other Variables 
CR3      -  3-firm deposit concentration percentage for the local banking market as of 
year-end. 
 
MS      -  Individual banks market share percentage as of year-end. 
 
MG      -  annual market deposit growth percentage. 
 
TB6      -  Secondary market monthly average six-month Treasury bill rate in basis 
points last month of each quarter. 
 
LOGTA    -  Natural log of total assets each quarter. 
 
BHC      -  Dummy variable equal to one [zero otherwise] if the bank is part of a bank 
holding compamy 
 
Q2 – Q36    -  Time dummy variables for 35 of the 36 quarters in the study. 
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Table 2.  SUMMARY  STATISTICS and CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
    (N = 9240) 
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Notes: Significance levels are in parentheses beneath the pearson correlation coefficients.  
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Table 3.  GMM Estimation of Risk-Adjusted Relationship Between Equally Weighted  












































































Notes: The dependent variable is rIndex.  T-ratios are in parentheses. (*** denotes significant at the 1 percent level).  The 
35 coefficients for the time dummy variables are not included in this table. 
   